Because It’s Right

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Morality teaches us that, if we look on her only as good for something else, we never in that case have seen her at all. She says that she is an end to be desired for her own sake, and not as a means to something beyond. Degrade her, and she disappears. – F. H. Bradley

I. Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Morality can be painfully demanding, so much so that we sometimes question the wisdom of complying with it. Yet, arguments that we have good reason to be moral are as old as Plato’s Republic. Indeed, according to H. A. Prichard, making this argument work is the central preoccupation of moral philosophy. But Prichard also believes that, to the extent this is true, the whole subject of moral philosophy rests on a mistake.2

* This is a revision of chapter 6 of David Schmidtz, Rational Choice and Moral Agency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). In addition to the many, many people who have helped me to think about this topic over the years, I want to thank Sam Black and Evan Tiffany for their interest in reprinting this material, and also for their interest in making it better.


Prichard is neither the first nor the last person to dismiss an entire discipline as a mistake, but Prichard has an argument that poses a real challenge to moral philosophy, an argument that repays sympathetic analysis. Prichard’s article emerges from a particular and peculiar philosophical tradition known as British intuitionism, yet the challenge it poses to moral philosophy is anything but parochial. On the contrary, the article has had and continues to have an influence independent of, even in spite of, the intuitionist tradition from which it emerges. For example, it anticipates and to some extent undoubtedly inspires the current anti-theory movement in ethics. Nevertheless, although dozens of articles cite Prichard’s famous essay, often with approval, it has seldom met with sustained criticism. This paper reconstructs and criticizes Prichard’s argument, then uses that critique


3 Anti-theorists characterize (and consequently reject) moral theorizing as an attempt to mechanically deduce all particular moral conclusions from a single universal principle. Robert Louden (Morality and Moral Theory [New York: Oxford University Press, 1992], chaps. 5 and 6) agrees that any theory fitting that description ought to be rejected but argues that the best and historically most prominent moral theories (i.e., those of Aristotle and Kant) do not fit the description.

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to lay foundations for the larger project of constructing a plausible moral philosophy.

Prichard says we begin to question whether we really ought to do our alleged duty – to keep a promise, for example – when we recognize that doing our duty will not give us what we desire. We then question things we usually accept as duties. We ask if there is any proof that we truly have a duty to act in ways usually called moral. Prichard sees two ways of interpreting this request. We could be asking whether being moral is prudent. Alternatively, we could be asking whether being moral is good in some nonprudential sense – good for others, for example, or intrinsically good quite apart from its consequences. Prichard thinks both versions of the question are mistakes, and I will look at each in turn.

How can we determine what is moral in the first place? We cannot simply check what is moral. At least, we cannot do so in the same way we can check who is prime minister. Nevertheless, like the term “prime minister,” the word “moral” is a word we inherit from an existing language. It comes to us laden with meaning. We can stipulate what we will be referring to when we say “brillig,” for that is not a term of ordinary language, but there are only so many things we could correctly refer to as “eggplant.” Like the word “eggplant,” the word “moral” is more than a made-up sound. We cannot simply stipulate that it refers to, say, the property of maximizing utility, any more than we could stipulate that the word “eggplant” refers to rutabagas.

A term’s extension consists of the set of things to which the term refers. The term “prime minister” may, under certain circumstances, have Jean Chrétien as its extension. Even so, we would not want to say Jean Chrétien is the meaning of the term prime minister. One

5 Actually, I suppose today we frame the question in terms of right action rather than moral action. My main reason for moving between these terms is stylistic, speaking of doing what is moral when I am trying to follow Prichard and of doing what is right otherwise. When speaking of persons rather than of actions (being moral as opposed to being prudent), or of separating the subject of morality from other subjects such as prudence, I find “being moral” and “morality” more natural than “being right” and “rightness,” but again, my reasons for choosing one word rather than another are in most cases stylistic rather than deeply philosophical.

6 Prichard, Moral Obligation, 2.
implication is that we might not know who is prime minister, despite knowing exactly what the term means. Similarly, even if we settle what the word “moral” means, we can still be uncertain about what is in fact moral.

As it actually happens, though, we tend to be surer of the word’s extension than of its meaning. We have a shared understanding that being moral involves being honest, kind, peaceful, and so on. (I will refer to this consensus as commonsense morality.) It may not be part of the meaning of “moral” that honesty is moral, but honesty may be and commonly is understood to be part of the term’s extension.

Moreover, the consensus is not only that we should call these things moral but also that we should be these things, which gives us a clue to the word’s meaning. When a person refers to an act by saying, “That’s immoral,” listeners normally understand the speaker to be saying there is reason not to do the act. Further, listeners will interpret the speaker as saying something other than that the act will not satisfy an agent’s desires. When a person says lying is immoral, listeners normally will understand the speaker to mean there is a special reason not to lie – special because it is grounded in something other than an appeal to the agent’s desires.

This way of understanding the term’s use may not fully capture the term’s meaning, any more than a set of injunctions to be kind, honest, and peaceful fully covers morality’s extension. The conclusion (so far) is only that moral reasons are understood to appeal to something other than the agent’s desires. Moral reasons are categorical, which means they have a claim on us that is independent of how they appeal to our interests and desires.8

7 It seems easier here to speak of wrongness rather than rightness as being associated with special reasons for action. That one course of action involves telling the truth does not imply that one should take that course, but that another course of action involves telling a lie has clear implications. Roderick Wiltshire (“The Wrong and the Good,” unpublished) argues that wrongness is a natural kind and rightness is not. Rightness is simply the logical complement of wrongness, in the way “non-dog” is the logical complement of “dog.”

8 I use the terms “categorical” and “deontological” almost interchangeably. An imperative is categorical if it makes no appeal to the agent’s interests and desires, and deontological if it makes no appeal to consequences of any kind. Thus, as I use the terms, a categorical imperative is a kind of deontological imperative.
When people argue about what is right, they may disagree about what constitutes this special kind of reason. Or they may agree that the property of maximizing pleasure constitutes a special reason for endorsement, but quarrel over which actions (or character traits or institutions, etc.) have this property. Even so, when people argue about whether something like affirmative action is right, they have a shared understanding that it matters whether affirmative action is right. People who argue about what is moral share an understanding that in order for an act to be morally required there must be a special reason to do it. That is why people care about what conclusion they reach regarding whether something like affirmative action is morally required (or forbidden). As they see it, whether they have special reasons to support (or resist) the practice goes hand in hand with whether the practice is morally required (or forbidden).

But do we need to prove we have such special reasons? As Prichard sees it, moral philosophy rests on the mistaken assumption that we do — a mistaken assumption that without proof that we have special reasons, we have no basis for saying we ought to conform to commonsense morality. Why is this assumption a mistake? Prichard asks us to consider how we would prove that conforming to commonsense morality (which I will refer to as being “CS-moral”) is moral. According to Prichard, there are two ways to try to prove that being CS-moral is moral, and both of them inevitably fail. The first way is to prove that being CS-moral will give us something we want.\(^9\) The second way is to prove there is something good (not necessarily for us) either in right action’s result or in right action itself. Prichard’s objections to these two approaches are as follows:

The first way fails because proving that being CS-moral will give us what we want is beside the point. The demonstration may show that being CS-moral is prudent, but not that being CS-moral is moral. As Prichard puts it, the exercise might convince us that we want to be CS-moral but cannot convince us that we ought to be.\(^{10}\) To show that


being CS-moral is moral, we have to show that we have characteristi-
cally moral reasons to be CS-moral, that is, reasons that at a minimum
do something more than appeal to our desires.

The second way, according to Prichard, boils down to saying happi-
ness or working for happiness is good and therefore we should work
for happiness in general (or if not for happiness, then for whatever
the fundamental good happens to be). This answer has an advantage
over the first approach, for at least it clearly does more than appeal
to our desires. (Even if the act is for our own good only, this goes
somewhat beyond mere appeal to desires.) But this second way also
fails, Prichard says, for it presupposes the view that the rightness of
acts has to do with what they accomplish. The “fatal objection” to
any teleological theory “is that it resolves the moral ‘ought’ into the
non-moral ‘ought,’ representing our being morally bound to do some
action as if it were the same thing as the action’s being one which we
must do if our purpose is to become realized.”

So goes my reconstruction of Prichard’s argument. In summary,
the rightness of keeping a promise, say, does not depend on whether
keeping it will have good results at all, let alone on whether keeping it
is in the promisor’s interest. Because attempts to prove we ought to do
what we believe is right inevitably appeal in one way or another to the
goodness of doing what we believe is right, Prichard concludes that
the only place to look for an answer to the question of why we should
do what is right is manifestly the wrong place to look. The reduc-
tionist urge to ground rightness in something more fundamental is

11 Prichard, Moral Obligation, 117. Prichard’s point applies to theories grounding
rightness in collective prudence as well. So Prichard’s objection not only chal-
genges the Platonic project but also most contractarian theories as well. For
example, the objection cuts against the view expressed by Kurt Baier (“Why
Should We Be Moral?” Readings in Contemporary Ethical Theory, ed. K. Pabel and
M. Schiller [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970]) that we should be moral
because being moral makes us all better off.

12 Prichard also rejects the idea that an action’s rightness lies not in its actual result
but rather in its intended result. I am inclined to disagree, depending on whether
we really are talking about evaluating the action’s rightness rather than, say, the
agent’s praiseworthiness, but present purposes do not require us to address this
further argument.

13 Prichard, Moral Obligation, 2.
misguided, for rightness neither can be nor needs to be grounded in anything else. The sense of an action’s rightness is, in fact, absolutely immediate.\textsuperscript{14} We see that being CS-moral is moral by direct apprehension, if we see it at all. Trying to prove that being CS-moral is moral is a mistake not unlike the epistemological mistake of trying to prove we are awake when we know we are awake by direct apprehension.\textsuperscript{15} It is an instance of the mistake of seeking a grounding for that which is itself bedrock.

The next two sections respond to Prichard’s argument. I argue that there is no mistake in asking whether being moral is prudent. Then I argue that there is no mistake in asking whether it truly is moral to do things like keep promises.

II. Morality versus Prudence

Prichard concedes that it can be perfectly legitimate to ask why we should perform a certain act when the act is incompletely described in relevant ways. The question becomes illegitimate, in Prichard’s view, when the act is described well enough that special reasons to perform the act are, in effect, built into the act’s description. For example, it may not be obvious that Kate has reason to give her neighbour a hundred dollars, but it is perfectly obvious that she has reason to \textit{repay a debt} by giving him a hundred dollars.\textsuperscript{16} Described in this more complete way, the act carries its reason on its sleeve. When an act is described in such a way that asking why we should do it becomes tantamount to asking why we should do what is required, the answer becomes obvious: we should do it because it is required.\textsuperscript{17}

Still, an act that is well described in moral terms may remain incompletely described in prudential terms. The question “What’s in it for me?” may remain unanswered. We could dismiss the latter question

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 7.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 8.

\textsuperscript{17} To call an act right is ambiguous. One might be saying the act is required or that it is permitted. The former sense is more relevant here. I use “right” and “required” interchangeably in what follows.
as morally irrelevant, but this would be to ignore the question rather
than answer it. Even if Prichard is correct that it is impossible to give
an argument why we morally ought to do the right thing, this does not
foreclose the possibility that philosophers might yet show that it is
prudent to do the right thing. So far, nothing in Prichard’s argument
counts against undertaking the Platonic project of showing that being
moral is profitable.

Prichard goes on, however, to engage the Platonic project more
directly. Prichard says proving that we have a prudential motive to do
the right thing would be beside the point. If we are talking about being
moral, we are not talking about doing the right thing for prudential
reasons. Rather, to be genuinely moral is to do the right thing precisely
because it is right. In Prichard’s words, “A morally good action is mor-
ally good not simply because it is a right action but because it is a right
action done because it is right, i.e., from a sense of obligation.”

It may seem, as evidently it seemed to Prichard, that the project of
reconciling prudence and morality cannot proceed unless this Kantian
line of argument is rebutted. This is not so. Even if we grant that being
moral involves following a categorical imperative, we may coherently
ask whether we are better off following a categorical imperative. And,
one way or another, the question has an answer. Whether or not moral
imperatives are categorical, there remains a fact of the matter concern-
ing whether following moral imperatives is to our advantage. To try
to show that being moral turns out to be prudent is not to mistakenly
treat moral imperatives as prudential imperatives. On the contrary, we
can try to prove a conditional of the form “If I want X, then I should
be moral” without in any way presuming that moral imperatives have
this same conditional form.

If we were asking whether prudence can be a proximate motive for
being moral and if we took “being moral” to entail “being motivated
by a sense of rightness rather than by prudence,” then Prichard’s
objection would be decisive. The question would be a mistake. The
actual question, however, is whether there is an extensional overlap

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18 Prichard, *Moral Obligation*, 10. Perhaps this is why Prichard thought the con-
nection between the sense of rightness and one’s reason to be moral has to be
“absolutely immediate.” If anything intrudes between the two, one will no longer
be doing the right thing for the right reason.
between being moral (and thus being motivated by a sense of rightness) and being prudent, in which case Prichard’s objection misses its mark. Asking whether doing the right thing is prudent does not presume only prudential answers could motivate our being moral. It does not presume prudence is even among the things that could motivate our being moral.

Demonstrating the existence of an extensional overlap need not motivate people to be moral. But really, that was never the point. The point is that even agents committed to doing what is right because it’s right might nevertheless wonder whether they would have done anything differently had they been more self-consciously prudent. Moral agents might care about this issue not because they seek a motivation for being moral but rather because they, like Glaucy, sometimes wonder whether they have prudential reasons to regret being moral, that is, whether their being moral is contrary to their self-interest. They simply wonder. It may not dampen their moral motivation in the slightest, but still, they would rather know, and the desire to know leads them to philosophize.

In summary, Prichard thinks it is a mistake to try to prove that being moral is for our own good, for the attempt presupposes that whether we ought to be moral depends on whether being moral is prudent. The presupposition may well be a mistake, but we need

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19 Prudence involves acting in one’s best interest simpliciter rather than acting in one’s best interest because it is in one’s best interest. Otherwise, if we interpret prudence in the latter sense, prudence and morality exhibit a particularly uninteresting kind of incompatibility; the real issue about the overlap between moral and prudent behaviour will inevitably resurface, cast in other terms.

20 One could see Prichard as rejecting rationalism in ethics in the same way Michael Oakeshott rejects rationalism in politics. That is, we understand and appreciate ethical traditions only from the inside, by living within them and by knowing their history. It is hubris to criticize traditions on the grounds that they fail to serve purposes we think ought to be served, or that they do not serve their purposes as well as imaginable alternatives. Such criticism is from the outside in, which is not a legitimate critical perspective. Instead, one must get inside the institution and experience the duties it imposes face-to-face and case by case. See the title essay in Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (Indianapolis: Liberty, 1991), 6–42. This theme also runs through the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. (The thesis that modern moral concepts are holdovers from earlier traditions, in which they had a significance that has since been lost, finds one of
presuppose no such thing. Asking whether being moral is prudent does not imply that we see morality or moral motivation as reducible to mere prudence. This version of the question is no mistake.

III. What Do We Do When We Do the Right Thing?

The previous section conceded that we should do what is right because it is right, but showed that this concession is hardly a conversation stopper. Whether it is prudent to be moral remains an issue. Further, even from the moral point of view, it is not enough to say we should do what is right because it is right. As Prichard would agree, the question we face as moral agents is not about philosophical generalizations, but rather about what to do when we get face-to-face with particular situations. And saying we should do what is right would be to miss the point of our asking what we should do. The point is, we need to have concluded that doing X is right before the incantation “because it’s right” can single out X as something we have reason to do. Naturally, we should do what is right, and let’s concede we should do so because it is right. But why should we keep promises? Why, in some rare cases, should we break them? Why should we tell the truth? Why, in some rare cases, should we lie instead? Why think keeping promises and telling the truth have anything to do with rightness?

“Why should I do what is morally required?” is the sort of question that wears its moral answer on its sleeve, even if it does not wear its prudential answer on its sleeve. But that is not the same kind of question as “Why should I tell the truth?” Rightness may wear moral


Now, there is merit in the Anscombe-MacIntyre-Oakeshott line of argument. Nevertheless, moral philosophy is itself a body of traditions and practices. Distancing oneself from the practice of criticizing ethical traditions and viewing that practice with a critical eye amounts to taking an outside-in approach to a central tradition of moral philosophy. Thus, to indulge in such criticism is also to tacitly endorse outside-in criticism. In effect, it involves criticizing philosophy from outside in by pointing out that philosophy too partakes of outside-in criticism. A telling critique will say something interesting about how to distinguish between the use and misuse of outside-in criticism.
motivation on its sleeve, but what rightness patently does not wear on its sleeve is its extension. Indeed, the question of which particular actions are right remains wide open. So Prichard has not only left undone the legitimate task of identifying prudential reasons not to regret being moral; he has also left us the more fundamental task of identifying what morality requires. (I don’t mean to say it was Prichard’s job to do this, but he seems to say that moral philosophy rests on the mistake of thinking that this task of identification can be a philosophical task.)

The latter was no accident, of course, for Prichard was, after all, an intuitionist. He says we intuit what is right. Be this as it may, the question in which we are interested is logically prior to this epistemological question. That is, even if we grant that there are occasions on which we learn that some act X is right by intuiting that X is right, we still want to know what it is about X that triggers our intuitions.21 Consider this: if we had no idea what triggers our intuitions, what grounds would we have for taking our intuitions seriously?22

One might insist that intuitionism is not only an epistemological thesis but also a thesis about what rightness is; a right action simply is an action that directly and immediately strikes us as something we have reason to do. I do not believe Prichard held this ontological thesis, but, in any event, this ontological variant of intuitionism amounts to a rather sinister reductionism. It reduces rightness to the sphere of that which directly and immediately strikes us as required. Consider what it implies about things we do not directly and immediately

21 Although Prichard’s article does not say what triggers our intuitions, those who worked within the intuitionist tradition had a great deal to say about it. The point, though, is not that nothing can be said, but rather that something needs to be said. And when we begin to say what warrants us in intuiting that X is wrong, we begin to leave Prichard’s brand of intuitionism behind.

22 With more ordinary intuitions, the answer might be experience. That is, we may have learned from experience to trust that sort of intuition. (“No, I do not want to get into that person’s car. I see no reason not to, but something is telling me not to.”) Still, the lesson of experience will not be simply that we should trust intuition, but that we have reason to trust intuition – doing so is for our own good, and we have a history of regretting the consequences of failing to do so. (So, I am not intending this as a concession to Prichard.) I owe the thought to Paul Bloomfield.
apprehend as required – things whose rightness (or wrongness) we
do not come to fully appreciate merely by getting face-to-face with
them. If we cannot directly apprehend that keeping a certain promise
is required, may we rule out on those grounds the possibility that keep-
ing the promise is required? Surely not.

If we take intuitionism to be addressing the question of what right-
ness is, we are taking it to be an alternative kind of reductionism rather
than an alternative to reductionism. It is more charitable to accept that
Prichard’s intuitionist epistemology leaves open the ontological ques-
tion about what properties occasion our intuitions.

Perhaps we learn general principles by generalizing from particu-
lar instances. We get face-to-face with particular instances, as Prichard
says, and then learn general principles by induction.23 Even so, the
order in which we learn particulars and general principles is not the
issue here. Even if we learn particulars first, there must be some-
thing about particular requirements that makes them requirements.
Whether or not we learn the particulars first, a question inevitably
remains regarding what we are seeing in a particular act when we see
it as required. What makes promise-keeping rather than promise-
breaking required? And why do we think promise-keeping in some
exceptional cases is not required after all, and may even be forbidden?
What makes those cases different? That we see them differently is not
what makes them different. We need to identify what is being seen
when some cases of promise-keeping are seen as required and others
as forbidden or at least not required.

The list of required acts has to be more than a mere list. If member-
ship in the category were determined arbitrarily, then Prichard would
be wrong, for in that case membership in the category of required
acts would not imply any special reason to do the act. Prichard wants

23 This is one of intuitionism’s core insights. Another is that, in forming moral
judgments, we draw upon tacit knowledge, some of which we are not capable
of fully articulating. Similarly, a wine taster may have an astonishing ability to
discern when and where the grapes came from, yet the information he or she
finds in the wine’s taste may be too subtle to put into words. These two ideas –
that our knowledge is fundamentally of particulars rather than universals and
that much of what we know is incorrigibly inarticulate – are also central tenets
of the moral anti-theory movement (cf. footnote 2). A reading of Prichard thus
is a useful introduction to the antitheory literature.
to say that an act being correctly labelled “required” is itself a good reason to do it – so good that we need no other reason. I am not quarreling with this. My point is only that if our intuitions are picking out some things as right and others as wrong, and doing so in a non-arbitrary way, this implies that acts we intuitively identify as right differ in some non-arbitrary way from acts we intuitively identify as wrong. What then is the difference?

One might think this misses the real point, which is that to call an act required is to state a special reason to do it. But suppose we mistakenly call an act required. In that case, we think we have stated a special reason to do it, whereas in fact there is no such reason to do it. We could say that to correctly call an act required is to state a special reason to do it, but then we still need to know what it is in an act that makes it true that the label “required” is correctly attached. If Prichard is correct in saying special reasons for action are entailed by an act’s being required, then we cannot label an action “required” (more precisely, we cannot know we have labelled the action correctly) until we know we have the requisite reasons for attaching the label, that is, that there really are special reasons for doing the act in question. We do not create the special reason merely by (perhaps mistakenly) applying the label.

For an act to be right, there must be a reason why it is right. Prichard’s concern – that deriving a sense of rightness from something else would run contrary to our actual moral convictions24 – is baseless. Indeed, if there were nothing in the keeping of a promise to ground our judgment that it is right, then the judgment itself would be baseless, which is contrary to our convictions if anything is.

Prichard is correct to say we already have a reason to perform an action when we see that it is required. We do not need to know what makes actions required in order to know we ought to do what is required. Still, one can ask what makes required actions required – in which case, we had better have something to say about when there is good reason to see an action as required. To answer questions of that sort, we need a rule of recognition for morals.

24 Prichard, Moral Obligation, 4.
IV. A Rule of Recognition for Morals

I argued against Prichard on two fronts. First, we can have something to say about whether being moral is prudent. Second, while we would be mistaken if we thought we needed to prove we have special reason to do X even after coming to appreciate that X is required (since it would be hard to appreciate that X is morally required unless we already appreciate the special reasons for doing X), we are not mistaken in hoping that philosophy can answer questions about what makes right actions right in particular cases. The remainder of this essay turns to the positive task of constructing a moral theory, trying to be mindful of Prichard’s challenge.

My approach to moral theory begins by borrowing from H.L.A. Hart. Hart’s legal theory distinguishes between primary and secondary legal rules. Primary rules comprise what we normally think of as the law. They define our legal rights and obligations. We use secondary rules, especially rules of recognition, to determine what the law is. For example, among the primary rules in my neighbourhood is a law saying the speed limit is thirty miles per hour. The secondary rule by which we recognize the speed limit is: read the signs. Exceeding speed limits is illegal, but there is no further law obliging us to read signs that post the speed limit. So long as I stay within the speed limit, the police do not worry about whether I read the signs. In reading the signs, we follow a secondary rule, not a primary rule.

We can think of moral theories in a similar way. For example, utilitarianism’s recognition rule is the principle of utility: X is moral if and only if X maximizes utility. As it stands, the principle defines a family of moral theories rather than any particular member thereof. The different flavours of utilitarianism are produced by replacing X with a specific subject matter. Act-utilitarianism applies the principle of utility to actions themselves. Act-utilitarianism’s fully specified

recognition rule – an act is right if and only if it maximizes utility – then translates directly into act-utilitarianism’s single rule of conduct: maximize utility. Rule-utilitarianism applies the principle of utility to sets of action-guiding rules. The resulting recognition rule states that an action guide is moral if and only if following it has more utility than would following any alternative action guide. Of course, the utility-maximizing set of primary rules might boil down to a single rule of conduct saying “maximize utility.” Then again, it might not.  

Deontological theories are harder to characterize. We could begin with a generic recognition rule saying X is moral if X is universalizable. Applying the rule to maxims yields a more specific recognition rule (something like “a maxim is moral if acting on it is universalizable”), which in turn yields a set of imperatives, reverence toward which is grounded in considerations of universalizability. Perhaps the idea of universalizability does not have enough content to yield determinate imperatives on its own. Deontology may need a second recognition rule formulated in terms of respect for persons as ends in themselves, so that the two rules can converge on a set of concrete imperatives. But that is another story.

A moral theory consists of a recognition rule applied to a particular subject matter. Given a subject matter, a rule of recognition for morals specifies grounds for regarding items of that kind as moral. By “grounds” I do not mean necessary and sufficient conditions. In act-utilitarianism, the principle of utility presents itself as necessary and

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27 I think the most defensible reading of the principle of utility would say not. Recognition rules are not ultimate rules of conduct; primary rules are not mere rules of thumb. Primary rules do not defer to the “ultimate” rules in cases of conflict. Again, consider the legal analogy. In a situation where obeying the speed limit somehow interferes with reading the signs, the primary rule is still binding. The speed limit does not give way to a “higher” law bidding us to read the signs. Likewise, in ethics, if we recognize that, in the world we actually live in, following the rule “keep promises no matter what” has better consequences than following alternative rules like “keep promises if and only if doing so maximizes utility,” then the principle of utility (qua recognition rule) picks out “keep promises no matter what” as being among morality’s rules of conduct.

28 I acknowledge that there are broader conceptions of deontology than this, revolving around a more general idea that being moral is a matter of having reverence for the moral law.
sufficient for an act’s morality, but trying to contrive necessary and sufficient conditions is not the only way (and I think not the best way) to do moral theory. To have a recognition rule, all we need is what I call a supporting condition.

A supporting condition is a qualified sufficient condition, qualified in the sense of being a sufficient basis for endorsement in the absence of countervailing conditions. Formulating recognition rules in terms of supporting conditions rather than attempting to specify necessary and sufficient conditions is one way of acknowledging intuitionist claims that we could never fully articulate all of the considerations relevant to moral judgment. We can allow for that possibility (without letting it stop us from doing moral theory) by formulating recognition rules in terms of supporting conditions – conditions that suffice to shift the burden of proof without claiming to rule out the possibility of the burden being shifted back again, perhaps by considerations we have yet to articulate.

As an example of a supporting condition, we might say, along the lines of act-utilitarianism, that an act is right if it maximizes utility, barring countervailing conditions. In two ways, act-utilitarianism properly so called goes beyond merely offering a supporting condition. First, it denies there are countervailing conditions, thereby representing the principle of utility as a proper sufficient condition, not just a supporting condition. Second, act-utilitarianism says an act is right only if the act maximizes utility, thereby representing the principle of utility not only as sufficient but also as necessary for an act’s morality.29

I do not think we will ever have a complete analysis of morality, any more than we will ever have a complete analysis of knowledge. We use such terms in a variety of related ways, and there is no single principle nor any biconditional analysis to which the varying uses can all be reduced. That is not an admission of defeat, though, for the important thing is not to find the one true principle but rather to look for principles that can form a backbone for a useful rule of recognition. Three points are worth highlighting:

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29 Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), defends a “hybrid” theory, which departs from act-utilitarianism by holding that maximizing utility is sufficient but not necessary for an act’s morality.
1. A moral theory can range over more than one subject matter.

We devise moral theories to help us answer questions raised by the subject of individual choice and action, of course. Yet, we might also want to assess individual character. Or we might want to assess the morality of the institutional frameworks within which individuals choose and act and develop their characters. These are distinct subject matters. So, moral theories range over a variety of subject matters. Any given theory may be monistic, ranging over only one, while ignoring or trying to reduce others, but pluralistic theories (pluralistic in the sense of ranging over more than one subject matter) are a real option.

2. A moral theory can incorporate more than one recognition rule.

There is nothing in the nature of morality to indicate that we should aim to answer all questions with a single recognition rule, because there is nothing in the nature of recognition rules to suggest there cannot be more than one. Modern ethical inquiry is often interpreted (maybe less often today than a few years ago) as a search for a single-stranded theory – a single rule of recognition applied to a single subject matter, usually the subject of what moral agents ought to do. Maybe Kant and Mill intended to promulgate single-stranded theories; friends and foes alike often take them to have done so. In any case, when interpreted in that way, their theories can capture no more than a fragment of the truth.

The truth is: morality is more than one thing. A theory will not give us an accurate picture of morality unless it reflects the fact that morality has more than one strand. Accordingly, I would not try to derive all of morality from a single recognition rule.

I once began a paper by noting that utilitarianism (which says rightness is determined by consequences) and deontology (which says it isn’t) both express powerful insights into the nature of morality. “On the one hand, doing as much good as one can is surely right. On the other hand, it is also right to keep promises, sometimes even in cases

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30 As Michael Stocker says, “Good people appreciate the moral world in ways which go beyond simply seeing what is to be done.” Plural and Conflicting Values (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 114.
where breaking them has better consequences." The paper concluded on a grim note. "We have intuitions about morality that seem essentially embedded in theories that contradict each other. Something has to give." At the time, I was stumped by this dilemma, but it has become clear that what can and should give is the assumption that morality is single-stranded. When we come to despair of finding the single property shared by all things moral, we can stop looking for essence and start looking for family resemblance. By abandoning the search for a single-stranded moral theory, we put ourselves in a position to notice that whether rightness is determined solely by consequences might depend on the subject matter.

3. A moral theory can be structurally open-ended.

Utilitarianism and deontology, or single-stranded interpretations thereof, try to capture the whole truth about morality with a single recognition rule. By the lights of either theory, the other theory is a rival competing for the same turf. The theories are closed systems in the sense that, having incorporated one recognition rule, and claiming to capture the whole of morality with it, they have no room for others.

By contrast, I see morality as an open-ended series of structurally parallel strands, each with its own recognition rule, each contributing different threads of morality's action guide. Any particular recognition rule has a naturally limited range, applying only to its own subject matter. No particular recognition rule pretends to capture the whole of morality, and so verifying that they do not do so will not refute the theory.

One might think we ought to be looking for the single recognition rule underlying all of morality, since a theory with more than one recognition rule would violate the principle of parsimony. But such an objection oversimplifies the principle of parsimony. The question is not whether a theory is simpler in the beginning, but whether it is simpler in the end. Gracefully admitting the real complexity of morality at the outset can make for a simpler theory in the end. Analogously,


32 Ibid., 627.
when astronomers abandoned the assumption that planetary orbits
were circular, having only one focal point, and accepted the reality of
elliptical orbits, which have two focal points, their theories became
simpler, more elegant, and more powerful.

V. The Normative Status of Morality’s Recognition
Rules
H.L.A. Hart, himself a legal positivist, argued that rules of recognition
for law may or may not pick out what is moral when they pick out
law. Herein lies a crucial disanalogy between rules of recognition for
morals and for laws. Questions about legality are sometimes answered
by simply “looking it up.” Arguably, we do not need to know we
have moral reason to obey a law in order to recognize it as law. Legal
positivism is, roughly speaking, the thesis that a recognition rule can
correctly pick out a rule of conduct as legal even though the rule is
immoral. But there can be no such a thing as moral positivism, since
it is incoherent to suppose a rule of recognition can correctly pick out
rule of conduct X as right when X is not right. It may not be essential
to laws that they have an inner morality, but we can entertain no such
agnosticism about morality itself. It is in the nature of Prichard’s con-
ception of morality (unlike law) that a recognition rule can correctly
identify actions as morally required only if there is decisive reason
(absent countervailing conditions) to perform them. Only such a rec-
ognition rule lets us stop the conversation – as Prichard would want
to stop it – upon concluding that our recognition rule identifies an
action as morally required.

We need to say more about what it means to regard X as right. I will
approach this issue by starting with a different question; namely, what
is being questioned when a person asks “Why be moral?”

First, when asked in earnest, “Why be moral?” is a question about
something that matters. “Why stand on one foot?” is, on its face,
an idle question, but “Why be moral?” is not. Second, the “Why be
moral?” question matters despite the fact that it patently does not pre-
sume that being moral matters to people from their first-person sin-
gular perspectives. Whether people have first-person singular reasons
to be moral is pointedly left open. Thus, the implicit urgency comes
from another source.
It stems, I would say, from the fact that morality essentially is something that matters to us from a first-person plural perspective. My endorsement begins to look like characteristically moral endorsement when grounded in the thought, not that I have reason for endorsement, but that we have reason for endorsement. While endorsement as rational need not go beyond the first-person singular, endorsement as moral at a minimum goes beyond first-person singular to first-person plural.\footnote{There is truth in Thomas Nagel’s thesis (see Nagel, \textit{The View from Nowhere} [New York: Oxford University Press, 1986]) that individuals inhabit both personal and impersonal points of view. The distinction between first-person singular and first-person plural perspectives, though, borrowed from Gerald Postema (“Conflict, Conversation, and Convention: Reflections on Hume’s Account of the Emergence of Norms of Justice,” unpublished), captures that truth in terms that seem more concrete and more firmly rooted in everyday experience. We can, though, imagine cases where the personal/impersonal distinction arguably would be more natural. For example, we might ask whether Robinson Crusoe can inhabit a plural perspective (and, if not, would he be incapable of moral endorsement?). Presumably, the answer is yes, at least in a subjunctive sense. (That is, Crusoe can ask himself whether he would want his eventual rescuers to understand what he did to survive, whether he expects they would approve.) But this distinction is not far from being what we might instead capture in the terminology of personal and impersonal.}

The second thing to say is that the transcendence of the singular perspective involved in moral endorsement cannot go much farther than this. If moral endorsement involves taking a plural perspective, then we can imagine how being moral could be disadvantageous for you or me and yet we could still have clear reason to endorse being moral. For example, many theorists now think of cooperating in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma as a paradigm case of being moral.\textsuperscript{34} While dis-
advantageous from an \textit{l}-perspective, it remains rational in the sense of being to our advantage from a \textit{we}-perspective. It is from a plural 
perspective that, in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, we find something irration-
al about individual rationality. When you and I each decide not to 
cooperate, I am doing the best I can, given your non-cooperation, and 
you are doing the best you can, given mine, and yet \textit{we} are not doing 
the best we can. However, if being moral were pointless not only from 
a singular perspective but also from a plural perspective as well, then 
it would be pointless – period. Being moral would be something we 
would have reason to avoid in ourselves and condemn in others. 
Being moral, though, is not like that. Being moral need not be prudent 
from a singular perspective, but part of the essence of being moral is 
that we have reason to endorse it from a plural perspective.

One thing that makes moral reasoning different from legal reason-
ing is that questions about how we recognize morality are hard to 
separate from questions about whether we have reason to endorse it. 
Morality’s recognition rules pick out the extension of “moral” just as 
the law’s recognition rules pick out the extension of “legal.” Morality’s 
recognition rules, however, pick out \textit{X} as moral by homing in on prop-
erties that, from a plural perspective, give us reason to endorse \textit{X}. We 
sometimes can discern the rules of the road by reading the signs. We 
sometimes can discern the applicable law simply by looking it up. 
Analogously, we might sometimes be able to discern what is moral 
simply by consulting what we (correctly) take to be a moral author-
ity. But in formulating a theory about what makes something moral, 
we are seeking to identify truth-\textit{makers}. So, although recognition rules 
especially serve an epistemological role, they serve that role by track-
ing moral ontology. Moreover, to constitute the sort of theory that

\textsuperscript{34} See especially David Gauthier, \textit{Morals by Agreement} (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986). A Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game in which individuals make separate 
decisions about whether to contribute to cooperative venture. In essence, the 
problem is, if an individual contributes, the benefits will be dispersed in such a 
way that the marginal benefit per unit of contribution is less than one unit to the 
contributor but more than one unit to the group. See David Schmidtz, \textit{The Limits 
of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument} (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1991), 105. In an obvious way, people are better off as a group if they contribute, 
but in an equally obvious way they are better off as individuals if they do not.
could play a recognition rule’s epistemological role in a moral agent’s life, we have to be talking about usable truth-makers. A theory’s recognition rules, then, have to direct us to look for a kind of truth; moreover, they have to direct us to look for a kind of truth that we are capable of finding. (What else could morality be?)

It is because morality is bound up with what we have reason to endorse from a plural perspective that “Why be moral?” is a pressing question. The “Why be moral?” question we inherited from Plato is a question about the relation between two kinds of telos – between what matters to us as individuals and what matters to us as a society. Because morality, as we conceive of it and as Plato conceived of it, matters to us from a first-person plural perspective, we have reason to hope it matters to us (or can be made to matter to us) from our first-person singular perspectives as well.

If, per impossible, morality did not matter from our plural perspectives, then neither would it matter whether morality could be reconciled with our singular perspectives. In different words, both Socrates and Glauccon care from a plural perspective about Glauccon’s being moral. They are treating the question of whether morality can be reconciled with Glauccon’s singular perspective as up in the air, yet there is some perspective, some other perspective, from which it is not up in the air. They want the answer to be that being moral is mandated by Glauccon’s singular perspective. Analogously, we care about whether people cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is in the interest of both players to decline to cooperate, so from their singular perspectives it makes no sense to be trying to convince them to cooperate. What makes sense in caring whether they cooperate is that there is a different perspective, a plural perspective, from which cooperating will make them better off.

“Who Are We?”

This takes us to one of the points at which satisfactory moral theorizing becomes really, really difficult. Unfortunately, while the scope of a person’s I-perspective is more or less fixed (encompassing the person’s own interests and preferences), the we-perspective does not have

35 I especially want to thank Philip Pettit for pressing me on this point.
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fixed borders, making it hard to characterize the *we*-perspective with any precision. It should go without saying, though, that the plural perspective is no mere fiction. (It is not for nothing that natural languages have words like *we* and *us* for plural self-reference.) When I speak of the *we*-perspective, what I have in mind is not the sort of group perspective you and I might take when we identify ourselves as fellow Mets fans, but rather the particular perspective we take when we worry about the “Why be moral?” question.

That perspective usually does not encompass the whole world.36 If I see that my mowing the lawn will hamper your efforts to write your book, then my taking a *we*-perspective involves identifying with you as a member of the group of people who will be affected by my mowing the lawn. If I see that mowing the lawn will adversely affect people in a faraway country (because they are waiting anxiously for your book), then my taking a *we*-perspective involves identifying with them as well. The scope of my *we*-perspective expands and contracts along with my awareness of whose interests are at stake.37 This does not mean I should not mow the lawn. We could not live together if we did not allow ourselves the latitude to impinge on one another in various ways. Your latitude may not serve your ends, and mine may not serve yours, but what is relevant from the plural perspective is that

36 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (“On Why Hume’s ‘General Point of View’ Isn’t Ideal — and Shouldn’t Be,” *Social Philosophy and Policy* 11 [1994]: 202–228) directly addresses this issue. The original version of this essay went to press before Geoff’s article appeared, but the ideas in this paragraph are similar enough to Geoff’s to make me wonder whether I got them from him. In any case, I thank Geoff for wonderfully illuminating conversations on such topics over a period of years.

37 The scope of my plural perspective will not always coincide with the scope of yours, which is one reason why we sometimes disagree about what is moral. Discussing our differences often helps us extend our perspectives in ways that bring them into alignment, though, so disagreement that can be traced to differences in perspectival scope need not be intractable. If you convince Kate that her *we*-perspective until now has failed to encompass the interests of members of other races, for example, then she will broaden her perspective accordingly. Or if she willfully refuses to do so, then her kind of *we*-perspective reveals itself to be quite unlike the perspective that I am attributing to people who earnestly ask the “Why be moral?” question.
our latitude serves our ends. We are better off in virtue of members of our group having that kind of latitude.

VI. The Descriptive Boundaries of Moral Inquiry

This, then, is the normative status of morality’s recognition rules. Being recognized as moral has normative force because, when morality’s recognition rules pick out X as moral, they do so by recognizing that X has properties we have reason to endorse from a plural perspective.38

Consider the following objection. Kate has reason from a plural perspective to endorse Disneyland. “We’ll have a lot of fun there. Nearly everyone does,” she says to her friends. Yet, though Kate endorses Disneyland from a *we*-perspective, she is endorsing it not as moral, but as amusing, or something like that. To endorse something as moral is to endorse it from a plural perspective, but not everything endorsed from a plural perspective is thereby endorsed as moral.

I agree with the objection. Certainly, we should not equate endorsing Disneyland from a plural perspective with endorsing Disneyland as moral. How then should we think of the plural perspective’s role in moral theory? From a plural perspective, we do not pick out maxims (e.g.) as moral. Still less do we pick out Disneyland as moral. Instead, we pick out a criterion for assessing maxims, given that maxims are subject to moral assessment.

Now, if something is a lot of fun for almost everyone, why is that not a property that we have reason to endorse from a plural perspective? Or if being a lot of fun is such a property, then what distinguishes endorsing something as fun from endorsing it as moral? Section IV noted that it is not the task of recognition rules to circumscribe their own subject matter. On the contrary, any theory pretty much takes a subject matter as given. There has to be a subject that gives rise to moral questions before we can have occasion to devise theories

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38 Note that this is a characterization of the perspective from which we formulate recognition rules. Whether *being* moral necessarily involves taking a plural perspective is a separate question. (Do morality’s rules of conduct include an injunction to take a plural perspective? No, they do not, any more than the rules of the road include an injunction to read the signs.)
to answer those questions. We begin with an intuitive understanding that subjects giving rise to moral questions are (roughly speaking) those that bear on human flourishing in communities, regarding which human action can make a difference. (Note that I am not offering intuitions as recognition rules for morals. On my theory, intuition enters the picture as a source of questions, not as a tool for answering them.) The subject matters of moral inquiry are pre-theoretically given, in the sense of raising moral questions prior to our devising moral theories to answer them.

Accordingly, “X is moral if X is a lot of fun” is not a recognition rule for morals because, when applied to any of the specific subject matters over which moral theories range, the property of being a lot of fun is not a reason for endorsement from a plural perspective. We do not in fact recognize it as reason to endorse capital punishment or promise-keeping or any of the subjects that normally raise moral questions.\(^{39}\) We do recognize it as a reason for endorsement when the subject is amusement parks, but that would make it a basis for moral endorsement only if amusement parks as such were among the pre-theoretically given subject matters of moral inquiry, and they are not. A moral perspective is more specific than a plural perspective, not because it is a more narrowly defined perspective, but rather because it consists of taking a plural perspective only with respect to issues already defined, intuitively and pre-theoretically, as moral issues.

To summarize, a recognition rule like the principle of utility could embody a genuine reason for endorsement from a plural perspective and still fail to exclude Disneyland as a subject for moral assessment. However, it is not incumbent on recognition rules to have the internal resources to limit their subject matters. We test a purported recognition rule, not in abstraction, but rather as applied to a pre-theoretically given subject matter. We test it by asking whether it homes in on a property that, given the subject matter, grounds endorsement from a plural perspective. For example, if we apply the principle of utility to

\(^{39}\) I suppose that if all we knew was that X is a lot of fun and does no harm whatsoever, then we might consider that grounds for endorsing X as morally permissible. If given the additional information that X = Disneyland, we might not retract our endorsement. We would not have judged X to be morally required, though, even before learning that X = Disneyland.
Disneyland, and then afterward decide that Disneyland, \textit{per se}, is not a subject of moral inquiry, it would be a mistake to blame the principle of utility for the misapplication.

We considered how recognition rules distinguish what is right from what is not, given a subject matter with respect to which such questions arise. I have no theory to tell me what the subject matters of moral assessment are; on my theory, that is a \textit{pre}-theoretical question. I have only a sense that morality and moral assessment concern what makes it possible for human beings to flourish together. Given this \textit{pre}-theoretical understanding of the general character of the subject matters of moral assessment, amusement parks are not among morality’s subject matters, but \textit{institutions} are. Thus, Disneyland is subject to moral assessment, not as an amusement park, but rather as an institution that has a bearing on whether people flourish within their communities. (Similarly, Michael Jackson was subject to moral assessment not as an entertainer but rather as a person whose choices had an impact both on himself and on many other people.) Likewise, acts, rules of conduct, and character traits are subjects of moral assessment because they affect whether people flourish within communities.

No doubt our intuitive conception of the proper subjects of moral assessment is more complicated than this, and I am not proposing to shed much light on our intuitive and \textit{pre}-theoretical understanding of the descriptive boundaries of moral assessment. It remains that, given an understanding of the subject matters of moral inquiry – of the kinds of things concerning which moral questions arise – we have something about which we can theorize. We can devise a theory about how those questions should be answered and why.

The descriptive boundaries of the subject matters of moral inquiry are given prior to our doing moral theory. They define what we want to have a theory about. Given a predefined subject matter, my proposal is that we capture the normative bite of morality’s recognition rules when we say they track properties that, with respect to that particular subject, we have reason to endorse from a plural perspective. If amusement parks are not among the subject matters of morality, then morality’s recognition rules do not range over amusement parks in the first place, which is why morality’s recognition rules cannot pick out Disneyland, \textit{per se}, as moral.
As with other intellectual endeavours, we need some sense of a subject matter and of questions to which it gives rise before we can have any reason to devise theories about it. Long before we begin to formulate moral theories, we already classify certain issues as moral issues. Roughly speaking, when an issue is crucial to human flourishing in communities, and when human beings can make a difference regarding that issue, we tend to see it as raising moral questions, and thus as a subject calling for moral theory. In this sense, the subject matters of moral inquiry are (at least provisionally) a pre-theoretical given.⁴⁰

VII. Is the Right Prior to the Good?

One might worry that if we analyze the rightness of acts in terms of the goodness of states of affairs, the concept of rightness loses its turf, so to speak. The concept becomes superfluous, and we may as well dispense with it entirely. But this worry is not well-founded. To explain our grounds for identifying an act as right is not to explain rightness away. The explanandum does not disappear merely in virtue of having been explained. In different words, giving an account of an action guide’s normative force does not eliminate the need for an action guide. We cannot dispense with talk about what is right because we cannot dispense with talk about what we should do. We can, however, still speak of keeping promises because it is right (or because breaking promises would violate rights). Thus, we are going beyond Prichard’s understanding of what moral philosophy can do but without rejecting Prichard’s understanding of morality and moral motivation per se.

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⁴⁰ Partly for this reason, I think a method of seeking “reflective equilibrium” is practically unavoidable in moral theorizing. I do not think of seeking reflective equilibrium as a meta-principle or a moral theory or even a formal philosophical method, really. I think of it simply as a matter of remaining responsive to that which is pre-theoretical. In the context of a given subject matter, we assess candidate action-guides (for example) by the light of our recognition rules. In turn, though, we assess our recognition rules by asking whether the action-guides they yield are plausibly responsive to what, pre-theoretically, seems important about that particular subject matter. I thank Thomas Pogge for discussions of this point.
Only when we ask how we recognize that keeping promises is right (or that breaking promises would violate rights) do we move from morality proper to moral epistemology: that is, from questions addressed at the action-guiding level to questions addressed by recognition rules. This is crucial. If we thought of recognition rules as part of morality’s action guide, we would be missing the distinction between recognition rules and rules of conduct. To properly address Prichard’s objections to teleology, a theory must isolate its teleology at the level of recognition rules, so that the concept of rightness can take on a life of its own at the action-guiding level. When a theory’s teleology is embedded in recognition rules, it specifies terms by which we recognize what is required, in the process leaving moral agents with an action guide that tells them what is required and which they follow because doing so is required.

In short, recognition rules, which have a teleological spirit, support action guides, parts of which may well be categorical. In turn, action guides support particular actions or choices. For the sake of example, suppose the principle of utility is morality’s recognition rule and that this principle recognizes a set of ten commandments against lying, stealing, and so forth, as morality’s rules of conduct. If we thought of the principle of utility as something like morality’s ultimate rule of conduct, then we naturally would interpret the ten commandments as rules of thumb – rules that give way to the principle of utility when it is obvious that following them will not maximize utility. A recognition rule, however, is not an ultimate rule of conduct. Rather, it identifies morality’s rules of conduct, a set of ten commandments in the case we are imagining, and the ten commandments are thereby certified as the ultimate rules of conduct. Conduct is judged not according to whether it maximizes utility, but rather in accordance with whether it follows the ten commandments.

a. Reading the Signs

Consider a legal analogy. “Read the signs” may be the rule by which we recognize rules of the road, but if we found ourselves in a situation where obeying a speed limit would somehow prevent us from reading a traffic sign, that would not be enough to make the speed limit give way. It would not even begin to make the speed limit give way. The
highway patrol judges our conduct by the rules of the road and would be properly unimpressed if we said we violated the rules of the road out of commitment to a “higher law” bidding us to read the signs.

Given that recognition rules are not rules of conduct, ultimate or otherwise, it is entirely possible that some of morality’s rules of conduct are deontological (that is, they make no appeal to consequences) even if morality’s rule of recognition is teleological. A rule by which we recognize deontological imperatives can be teleological without in any way affecting the deontological force of the imperatives thus identified. An imperative may dictate an action without appealing to the action’s role in serving the agent’s purposes; indeed, it may dictate action without appealing to anyone’s purposes. This leaves open whether the imperative has teleological support. It may serve a purpose to be committed to keeping promises come what may, even though it sometimes happens that keeping a promise serves no purpose. It serves a purpose to keep regular office hours even though some of those hours predictably will be spent waiting in vain for students to drop by.

A teleological recognition rule, applied to imperatives, is analogous to a rule of recognition in law; we need it only when pondering whether a particular imperative is moral. Upon recognizing an imperative as moral, we thereby know what we need to know to see that we have a moral reason to follow it. Having settled that the imperative is morally imperative, the rule of recognition has no further role to play. It drops out, leaving us with action-guiding imperatives that may well present themselves to us in deontological form. In any event, the action-guiding imperative, not the rule of recognition, is what guides action.

41 At best, Prichard says, the element of truth in the view that rightness is tied to goodness is that, unless we recognize that an act will give rise to some good, we would not recognize that we ought to do it. But, he adds, this does not mean pain’s badness is the reason not to inflict it (5). This looks like a massive concession, but Prichard mentions it in passing as if it were unimportant. In a footnote, Prichard claims that if pain’s badness grounded the wrongness of inflicting it, then inflicting pain on oneself would be as wrong as inflicting it on others. But this does not follow. Suppose two rules of conduct (Do not inflict pain on others; do not inflict pain on yourself) are grounded in the same principle (Pain is bad). Contra Prichard, the common grounding implies nothing about whether the two rules of conduct are equally stringent.
A “soft” deontological prohibition is insensitive to consequences in normal cases but makes exceptions in extraordinary cases. We saw how there could be a teleological grounding for imperatives that are normally insensitive to consequences. In contrast, absolute imperatives are insensitive to consequences even when the universe is at stake. It is conceivable, though just barely, that we could have teleological grounds for recognizing an absolute imperative as moral. It might have good consequences to internalize the rule “I will not lie – not even to save the universe,” so long as it never actually happens that we need to lie to save the universe. I doubt that there are any teleologically well-grounded absolute rules of conduct, but the idea is perfectly coherent. The idea that morality is teleological at the level of recognition rules does not preclude the possibility of there being absolutely exceptionless rules of conduct.

b. When Good Reasons Are Redundant

There is, of course, a controversy in moral philosophy over whether the right is prior to the good. Some theorists dismiss the idea that morality’s recognition rules are teleological; they assume it contradicts their belief that the right is prior to the good. It would be a mistake to dismiss my theory on that basis, though. My theory is entirely compatible with the view that the right is prior to the good at the action-guiding level. We should keep promises because it is right, and at the action-guiding level this is all that needs to be said. But that does not tell us what makes promise-keeping right, or even (in cases of doubt) whether promise-keeping is right. When it comes to recognizing what is right, the good is prior to the right, and must be so. We judge acts in terms of right, but when we need to explain what makes an act right, or whether it is right in a doubtful case, we can do so only in terms of good. So, regarding the controversy over the
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relative priority of the right and the good, the truth is, (1) the right is prior at the action-guiding level, and (2) the good is prior at the level of recognition rules.42

Teleological considerations need not enter a moral agent’s deliberations about what to do. If we cannot act without breaking a promise, then under the circumstances that may be all we need to know in order to know we categorically should not act. Sometimes, though, we do not know what morality requires of us. Some promises should not be kept, and we do not always know which promises are which. When we do not know, we need to fall back on recognition rules, which identify the point of being categorically required (required on grounds that do not appeal to the agent’s interests and desires) to act in one way rather than another.

Prichard thinks that if one understands that keeping a particular promise is required, one thereby recognizes reason to keep it. In that case, pointing out that keeping promises has good consequences would be irrelevant. Prichard is right, and now we can see why. When we already recognize that we are required to keep a promise, pointing out good reasons to keep it is redundant. The redundancy of pointing out good reasons to keep a promise, when we already see that keeping it is required, is what makes the good reasons irrelevant.43 But what if we have not yet recognized that keeping a particular promise is required? In that case, coming to see that breaking the promise would have bad consequences is not redundant at all. In

42 Although John Rawls’s official position is that in justice as fairness the right is prior to the good (A Theory of Justice [Cambridge: Belknap 1971], 31), his theory’s recognition rule is paradigmatically teleological. We’re to recognize a principle as just by asking whether people behind a veil of ignorance would perceive a basic structure informed by the principle as being to their advantage. “The evaluation of principles must proceed in terms of the general consequences of their public recognition and universal application” (1971, 138). This is not the sort of statement one expects to find at the core of a theory in which the right is supposed to be prior to the good. Perhaps what Rawls really wants to say is that the right is prior to the good at the action-guiding level.

43 Even so, we should not concede to Prichard that pointing out good reasons to keep promises is always irrelevant to someone who believes promise-keeping is required. Even someone who believes promise-keeping is required might be unable to articulate good reasons to keep promises and might learn something from discussion.
that case it is Prichard’s point that is irrelevant, for in that case we are not asking why we should do what is required. Rather, we are asking whether keeping this promise is required in the first place.

c. It’s Not Just a Good Idea. It’s the Law.

One might be troubled by the idea of keeping a promise simply “because it’s right.” “Because it’s right” may seem oddly abrupt as a reason for action. However, it certainly is not peculiar to morality. For example, when a motorist’s impatient passenger asks her why she is driving at twenty miles per hour, it would not be peculiar for the motorist to reply by saying “because it’s the law.” Her passenger now knows why she is driving at twenty miles per hour and might go on to ask how she knows that it is the law. She might answer that she read the speed limit sign. In a more philosophical if still somewhat impatient frame of mind, the passenger might then ask what the telos of the twenty miles per hour speed limit. What justifies it? The driver may not know. But she still knows the law. Further, if she knows there is a school in the neighbourhood, then she can add that the school’s presence justifies the law (and she can say this while having no idea whether the school’s presence is what motivated authorities to impose the speed limit). A conversation about morality might unfold in the same way. Asked why she keeps promises, a person might say, “Because it’s right.” She might be asked about the telos of promise-keeping, or about how she knows keeping promises is right, but those will be different questions.

In summary, Prichard denies that the good plays a role in determining the right. He infers this from the premise that we keep promises because doing so is right, not because doing so is good. I accept the premise, but the inference is invalid. Of course we should keep promises because it is right, and at the action-guiding level this is all that needs to be said. But this is different from asking why promise-keeping is right, or (in cases of doubt) whether promise-keeping is right. To answer the latter questions, pointing out that we have intuitions about promise-keeping is not enough. (Perhaps our intuitions are tracking the good.) We need to articulate reasons to keep promises. And pointing out that promise-keeping is right is to imply there are reasons rather than to identify them. Explaining why we ought to do
what is right and identifying what is right in the first place are different tasks.

VIII. Conclusion

We examined H. A. Prichard’s argument that the question “Why be moral?” is fundamentally confused. It turns out that there is no confusion involved in asking the question from a prudential point of view. Asking the question from the prudential point of view does not presuppose any reduction of morality to a system of prudential imperatives. On the contrary, we can intelligibly ask whether following categorical imperatives is to our advantage. One way or another, the question has an answer.

A recognition rule cannot be constituted in such a way that the action guide it picks out is as likely to lead us to do bad as to do good. Morality’s recognition rules cannot be arbitrary with respect to goodness. Otherwise, arbitrarily identifying an act as right will not give us a reason to do it. And the idea that we could identify an act as morally imperative without in the process coming to have a reason to perform it is contrary to the supposition shared by Prichard that we should do what is right because it is right. A recognition rule for right action essentially picks out, as right, actions for which there are good reasons, which is precisely what allows us to conclude, as Prichard wants us to conclude, that to recognize their rightness is to recognize good reason to do them.

We have not explored any particular theory about the content of morality’s recognition rules beyond saying they recognize a thing as moral by recognizing reason to endorse it from a plural perspective. Rational Choice and Moral Agency offers a theory (I call it moral dualism) about the content of morality recognition rules, and about the respective subject matters over which they range. This essay’s burden has been to show why we can safely reject H. A. Prichard’s conclusion that seeking to identify such rules is a mistake. Further, we can reject his conclusion while allowing that his premises (as I understand them) are not without merit.